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Most existing theories of the ￿rms de￿ne a ￿rm as a collection of physical
assets, and hence can not explain the ￿rm from a human-asset perspective,
which is of particular importance for understanding human-capital intensive
￿rms. To ￿ll in the gap, this paper proposes an alternative de￿nition ￿a ￿rm
is a group of people who work in a very close way so that outsiders cannot
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1clearly distinguish one group member from another. By this de￿nition, the
boundaries of the ￿rm matter because they can alter investment speci￿city
and hence alleviate or aggravate the hold-up problem. Speci￿cally, when there
is substantial investment externalities integration is more e¢ cient, and con-
versely separation is more e¢ cient when investment externalities are small.
This result is obtained under both Nash and alternating-o⁄er bargaining. The
e⁄ect of ￿ relational contracts￿(Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1]) is also exam-
ined to show that the newly de￿ned organization structures matter even when
relational contracts can be signed.
1 Introduction
What di⁄erence does it make when ￿rms merge? This question has been extensively
studied in economics ￿from the traditional undergraduate microeconomics that ar-
gues mergers can internalize externalities, to the modern property rights approach
that argues when one ￿rm acquires another the former enjoys a better bargaining po-
sition and hence is more willing to make relationship-speci￿c investment. However,
in most of these theories the ￿rms are de￿ned as collections of physical assets, and
people are often left out of the picture. As a result, they cannot consider ￿rms from a
human perspective, which is particularly important in understanding human-capital
2intensive ￿rms, such as law, consulting, medicine, investment banking, advertis-
ing and accounting ￿rms, that are playing an increasingly important role in most
economies. This problem has been recently pointed out by Zingales [14], and some
studies have been devised to address it. For example Rajan and Zingales [11] and
[12] de￿ne a ￿rm as a set of unique assets and a group of people who have access
to those assets. However, these studies do not focus on explaining the boundaries
of the ￿rms, and hence the question of why ￿rms ￿de￿ned as collections of human
assets ￿merge or separate is left unanswered. This paper will propose a preliminary
step in this direction.
The main idea is based on the following observation ￿when ￿rms merge, their
individual values become less clearly observed from the outside of the integrated
￿rm. One reason, among many others, for this could be that after ￿rms merge a
common name is normally used to represent both of them and integrated ￿nancial
reports are issued instead of separated reports. Alternatively, it could be because
￿rms intentionally blur employees￿individual identities to promote team work and
discourage individualism. An example, which is not directly related to industrial
mergers but to institutions in general, is that many joint research papers in economics
are published with the authors￿names listed in alphabetical order, instead of ranked
by contributions, so that individual contributions are harder to assess (Engers et al.
3[5].)
As a result of the observation, external markets are forced to make an estimation
if they want to know the value of a particular segment of a ￿rm. This estimation will
be based on the markets￿belief about how di⁄erent components of the total value
of the ￿rm should be attributed to the segment. For example, if a certain segment
of IBM is believed to be responsible for its hardware maintenance service, then the
failure or success of this service will be mostly attributed to that segment. However,
what is important is that because this segment belongs to a ￿rm that contains other
segments, and the individual identities of those segments cannot be clearly observed,
the true value of each segment will be, to some extent, misattributed to others by the
external market. Consequently, the markets￿estimation of the value of any particular
segment of a ￿rm will depend on the true values of all segments in the ￿rm.
This type of ￿ identity mixing￿can be easily observed in the real world. For
example, employers, for lack of better information, often evaluate job candidates
by looking at the performance of the ￿rms for which they use to work. In fact,
a candidate from a successful ￿rm (e.g.￿ General Electric) is often considered to
be of higher quality than a candidate from a ￿rm that is in trouble (e.g., Author
Anderson after the Enron scandal) regardless of the real qualities of the candidates.
In addition to individual workers, the identify of a segment of a ￿rm is often a⁄ected
4by the rest of the ￿rm. For example, Electronic Data Systems, an information-
technology consultancy, is recognized as having expertise in the automotive industry
because it used to belong to General Motors. After Electronic Data Systems was
separated from General Motors, this recognition helped it to win a 10 year extensive
contract with Rolls-Royce in 1995. Although one might argue that judging workers
by the ￿rm they work for, or business segments by the ￿rms they belong, can give
one a decent picture of their true value, the important thing is that the picture is
rarely 100% clear and, more interestingly, in many cases the picture is very vague.
Based on the above discussion, we can de￿ne a ￿rm as a group of people who
work together in a close way such that outsiders can only identify with the ￿rm as a
whole and not with individual employees. Hence, the boundaries of the ￿rms can be
viewed as ￿ information garbling￿devices that blur employees￿individual outside iden-
tities. By this de￿nition, we ￿nd that integration is more e¢ cient when investment
externalities are high (for example, when the value of one person￿ s human capital
increases rapidly with another person￿ s e⁄ort) and less e¢ cient when investment ex-
ternalities are low. This result can be obtained under both Nash (as in Grossman
and Hart [6] and Hart and Moore [7]) and alternating-o⁄er (as in Chiu [3] and De
Meza and Lockwood [10]) bargaining, two leading bargaining structures used in the
literature. In the latter part of the paper, the investment game will be allowed to be
5repeated so that parties can sign ￿ relational contracts￿as de￿ned by Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy [1]. Hence, the in￿ uence of the newly de￿ned organization structure on
the feasibility of relational contracts can be examined.
To illustrate the intuition, consider one of the most signi￿cant recent mergers
in consulting industry ￿that between IBM and PricewaterhouseCoopers￿consulting
practice (henceforth PwC). It is believed that this merger will help IBM, the major
revenues of which come from selling and maintaining hardware, to reinvent itself as
an expert in high-end business strategy ￿an image that PwC currently enjoys. We
will use the following hypothetical scenario to explain the idea of the paper. Suppose
that a project requires a new business strategy (potentially from PwC) and a new
computer system (potentially from IBM) to implement the strategy. IBM￿ s invest-
ment could have positive externalities (spillovers) to the value of PwC￿ s strategy:
that is, the value of PwC￿ s strategy can be increasing in IBM￿ s investment. For
example, IBM￿ s investment in designing a test-run system might identify potential
problems in PwC￿ s strategy and help PwC to ￿x them. In addition, any value that
is added to PwC￿ s strategy can be realized even though the strategy is implemented
with a system that is provided by a ￿rm other than IBM. This means that IBM￿ s
investment can also have positive externalities to PwC￿ s outside option. Continuing
with the example, even if PwC eventually decide to implement its strategy with a
6system that is designed by a ￿rm other than IBM, Pwc￿ s enhanced strategy still ben-
e￿t from IBM￿ s investment early on because it is free from the identi￿ed potential
problems.
If PwC and IBM are two separated ￿rms, then this enhanced outside option
accrues only to PwC, because the market knows clearly that PwC is responsible for
strategy. However, if PwC and IBM were two segments of one integrated ￿rm called,
say, X, the market will not be clear about who is responsible for the strategy. In this
case, IBM might be able to capture some of PwC￿ s enhanced outside option, because
if it were to be separated from PwC, people might think that it had more expertise
in strategy than it actually did and hence will be willing to pay more for its services.
This additional outside option enhances IBM￿ s bargaining position with PwC, and
provides additional incentives for IBM to invest.
With the well-known holdup problem and the resulting underinvestment in the
background, integration will improve e¢ ciency when the externalities are large be-
cause integration can then induce much more investment from IBM without forgoing
too much investment from PwC for losing some of its outside option to IBM. Con-
versely, when the externalities are small, integration can be suboptimal. One example
of the latter case is the recent collaboration of IBM and KPMG on a product to en-
hance ￿nancial reporting. IBM and KPMG might work as independent ￿rms because
7there is no substantial investment externalities between them, and hence the bene￿t
of giving one the other￿ s outside option is not enough to cover its cost.
In the related literature, the property rights approach pioneered by Grossman
and Hart [6] and Hart and Moore [7] is one of the most prominent theories of the
￿rms. The general theme of this approach is that, when contracts are incomplete,
the ownership of physical assets matters because it can alter the marginal return on
investment and hence change the investors￿incentives to invest1. As argued above,
this physical-asset perspective loses sight of the human aspects of ￿rms.
Levin and Tadelis [9] studied human-capital intensive ￿rms and built a theory
of partnerships, but did not focus on the boundaries of the ￿rms. The comparison
between partnership and our idea of the ￿rms is that partnership is usually de￿ned
as an institution that redistributes pro￿ts among partners, whereas the ￿rm is an
institution that redistributes outside options among members of the ￿rm. This model
is similar to some of the recent studies on reputation (for example Tadelis[13] )
because it also entertains the idea that outside identity can be transferable, although
the de￿nition of outside identity is rather di⁄erent here. Moreover, the idea that
garbling information can improve e¢ ciency can be found in the literature on career
1Under the Nash bargaining structure of Grossman and Hart[6] and Hart and Moore[7], own-
ership can enhance a manager￿ s investment incentives. Under the alternating-o⁄ers bargaining
structure of Chiu [3] and De Meza and Lockwood [10], however, ownership can hinder the man-
ager￿ s investment incentives.
8concern (for example Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole[4]). Finally, investments with
externalities have been studied in various literatures under di⁄erent names. For
example, in the incomplete contract literature they are called cooperative investment
by Che and Hausch[2]. Again, very few of these studies deal with the boundaries of
the ￿rms, which are the main focus of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a one-shot investment game
between two investors and the main results of considering both Nash and alternating-
o⁄er bargaining structures. Section 3 extends the one-shot results by repeating the
investment game, in the same way that Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] extended
the results of Grossman and Hart [6] and Hart and Moore [7]. Section 4 concludes
the paper.
2 The One-shot (spot) investment game
2.1 Basic setup
Imagine that a project requires collaboration between consultants A and B, which
means combining their human capital and solving one problem (but does not mean
integration, as discussed latter.) Denote as a 2 R+ and b 2 R+ the investments
that consultants A and B make in increasing their human capital. The private
9marginal costs of the investments are unity for both consultants. Denote the values of
consultant A and consultant B￿ s human capital as A(a;b) and B (a;b), respectively.
Assume that the total value of the project is the sum of the values of consultant
A and consultant B￿ s human capital, that is A(a;b) + B (a;b). Assume also that
Ab > 0 and Ba > 0. This re￿ ects the idea that one person￿ s investment has positive
externalities to the other2. In addition, assume that the Hessian D2F (a;b), where
F (a;b) ￿ A(a;b) + B (a;b) ￿ a ￿ b, is a negative de￿nite symmetric matrix so that
￿rst order conditions imply optimality. In the above setting, the ￿rst best investment
is a pair (a￿;b￿) such that (a￿;b￿) = argmaxA + B ￿ a ￿ b or
Aa (a
￿;b
￿) + Ba (a
￿;b
￿) = 1 and (1)
Ab (a
￿;b
￿) + Bb (a
￿;b
￿) = 1. (2)
If consultants A and B collaborate and the project is carried out, then a return
equal to A(a;b) + B (a;b) will be paid jointly to them. However, if either of them
decides to withdraw their human capital and cancel the collaboration, the project will
totally fail and generate no value. In that case, each consultant can independently
use their individual human capital to trade with an outsider and receive an outside
option. Denote the values of consultant A and consultant B￿ s human capital in the
2For simplicity, negative spillovers are not considered.
10secondary projects as A(a;b) and B (a;b), respectively. In addition, the investments
that consultants A and B make are relationship-speci￿c in the sense that their human
capital will be discounted in their respective outside options because these options
are less e¢ cient uses of their human capital. In fact, assume that A = ￿A and
B = ￿B where ￿ 2 (0;1). Note that the setup above allows the investment of one
consultant to a⁄ect the other￿ s outside option, which is one of the important features
of the model.
The other important feature is that the outside market may or may not observe
the fact that consultant A owns A(a;b) and consultant B owns B (a;b), depending
on whether consultants A and B are separated or integrated. Speci￿cally, we assume
that the outside market believes, with probability one, that ￿ 2 [0;1] portion of
A(a;b) belongs to A (and hence the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ portion belongs to B) and
￿ 2 [0;1] portion of B (a;b) belongs to B (and hence the remaining 1 ￿ ￿ portion
belongs to A.) This setting allows us to parameterize all of the possible organization
structures by the beliefs of external labor markets. Hence the following will discuss
an organization structure with parameters (￿;￿) as O(￿;￿). There will also be a
continuum of di⁄erent types of organization structures, and integration is relatively
de￿ned as in the following, which re￿ ects the idea that a higher degree of integration
11means a greater distortion of individual identities.3
De￿nition 1 O(￿;￿) is more integrated than O(￿0;￿
0) if ￿ < ￿0 and ￿ < ￿
0.
Suppose that external labor markets will pay consultants A and B the ￿ estimated￿
values of their respective human capital based on their beliefs. This implies that con-
sultant A and consultant B￿ s outside options under O(￿;￿) equal ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B
and (1 ￿ ￿)A + ￿B respectively. Hence, the reservation value of any particular em-
ployee essentially becomes a mixture of the reservation values of all employees in the
￿rm, with weightings depending the parameters of the boundaries of the ￿rms, i.e.
￿ and ￿.
Note that integration and collaboration mean di⁄erent things: the former is a
special type of organizational arrangement and the latter is a task that needs to
be accomplished by organizational arrangement (not necessarily integration.) For
example, consultants A and B can collaborate under a totally separated organization
structure (that is, when ￿ = ￿ = 1). Furthermore, consultants A and B know that it
is jointly more pro￿table for them to collaborate, but they need to bargain over the
joint return A(a;b)+B (a;b) after they invest. This introduces the well-known hold-
up problem, and the following two sections analyze this problem under two leading
3The de￿nition for separation is symmetric.
12bargaining structures used in the literature: Nash bargaining and alternating-o⁄ers
bargaining.
2.2 Nash Bargaining
Assume consultants A and B bargain over the total surplus, A(a;b) + B (a;b), in
a 50-50 Nash bargaining game where their reservation values equal their respective
payo⁄s in external labor markets. Given organization structure O(￿;￿), consultant
A￿ s payo⁄ is
F
NA (a) ￿ ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B +
1
2
[A + B ￿ A ￿ B] ￿ a (3)
and consultant B￿ s payo⁄ is
F
NB (b) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)A + ￿B +
1
2
[A + B ￿ A ￿ B] ￿ b. (4)
Here we need to extend our assumptions about second order conditions to include
that Aaa < 0 for all b, Bbb for all a so that a Nash equilibrium of this investment game
is a pair of investments
￿
aN;bN￿
that satis￿es the following ￿rst order conditions:
1
2












Ba = 1 (5)
131
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Bb = 1. (6)
Because the investments are relationship-speci￿c, one will expect there to be under-
investment. Lemma 1 veri￿es this.
Lemma 1 With 50-50 Nash bargaining between consultants A and B, there is un-





￿ for all ￿;￿ 2 [0;1].
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that aN < a￿ because the argument for bN < b￿ is sym-
metric. By the assumption that Aaa and Baa < 0, we know consultant A￿ s marginal
bene￿ts in (1) and (5) are both decreasing functions of a; and hence whichever situa-
tion gives A an higher marginal bene￿t will induce higher investment from consultant
A. In addition, A = ￿A and B = ￿B imply that
1
2












Ba < Aa + Ba
Consequently, aN < a￿.
By solving (5) and (6) for ￿ and ￿, we can obtain the characterization of the set
of investments that is implementable under an organization structure, which is given
14in Lemma 2. Note that, from the previous analysis, the ￿rst best investment (a￿;b￿)











, where X = 1 ￿ 1
2 (Aa + Ba) ￿ 1
2 (Ba ￿ Aa) and Y = 1 ￿ 1
2 (Ab + Bb) + 1
2 (Bb ￿ Ab),
then a and b are implementable under O(￿(a;b);￿ (a;b)).
Because the relationship speci￿city of investment is the source of the underin-
vestment problem, the degree of relationship speci￿city should a⁄ect equilibrium
investments . Following the spirit of Chiu [3], we can de￿ne why one organization
structure makes one investor￿ s investment less (more) relationship-speci￿c.
De￿nition 2 O(￿;￿) makes consultant A￿ s (consultant B￿ s) investment less relationship-
speci￿c than O(￿0;￿
0) does if ￿0Aa+(1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba < ￿Aa+(1 ￿ ￿)Ba (if (1 ￿ ￿0)Ab+
￿
0Bb < (1 ￿ ￿)Ab + ￿Bb). Conversely, O(￿;￿) makes consultant A￿ s (consultant
B￿ s) investment more relationship-speci￿c than O(￿0;￿
0) does if ￿0Aa+(1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba >
￿Aa + (1 ￿ ￿)Ba (if (1 ￿ ￿0)Ab + ￿
0Bb > (1 ￿ ￿)Ab + ￿Bb).
15In De￿nition 2, the degree of relationship speci￿city is de￿ned in terms of each
investment￿ s marginal return in its outside option. Because the marginal returns of
a under O(￿;￿) and O(￿0;￿
0) are both decreasing functions of a, if O(￿;￿) makes
an investor￿ s investment less (more) relationship-speci￿c than does O(￿0;￿
0), then
O(￿;￿) induces higher (lower) investment from this investor than does O(￿0;￿
0).
This observation gives us the following partial ordering of organization structures.
Proposition 1 If O(￿;￿) makes both consultant A and consultant B￿ s investments
less (more) relationship-speci￿c than does O(￿0;￿




In reality, externalities certainly play an important role in mergers ￿the word ￿ syn-
ergy￿has been one of the most popular buzzwords used in justifying mergers. From
the standard physical-asset perspective, the idea that integration can internalize ex-
ternalities is very well known. For example, when competing duopolies are integrated
and become a monopoly the joint producer surplus increases. The explanation of this
standard perspective is rather trivial ￿integration simply transforms a multi-person
game into a single-person decision problem. However, if we view a ￿rm as a group
of people instead of assets, it is not entirely clear why integration can internalize
16externalities, because the problem is always a multi-person game, before or after
integration.
In our model, the externalities of investments (in addition to relationship speci-
￿city) also play a very important role in determining the optimal organization struc-
ture. De￿nition 3 below categorizes two di⁄erent levels of externality. When the
marginal bene￿t of one investor￿ s investment to the other investor is lower than that
to himself, the externality is relatively small; otherwise, the externality is relatively
big.
De￿nition 3 Consultant A￿ s (consultant B￿ s) investment is more productive in her
(his) own outside option if Aa > Ba (Bb > Ab). consultant A￿ s (consultant B￿ s)
investment is less productive in her (his) own outside option if Aa < Ba (Bb < Ab).
Proposition 2 is one of our main results, and provides a link between externalities
with the boundaries of the ￿rms from a human-capital perspective.
Proposition 2 If O(￿;￿) is more integrated than O(￿0;￿
0), then we have
(a) O(￿;￿) cannot induce higher investments from consultants A and B if both
investors￿investments are more productive in their own outside option (externalities
are small). In particular, O(￿0;￿
0) can induce higher investments from both consul-
tant A and consultant B, and hence is more e¢ cient if externalities (Ab and Ba) are
small enough.
17(b) O(￿;￿) can induce higher investments from both consultant A and consultant
B, and hence is more e¢ cient if both investors￿investments are less productive in
their own outside option (externalities are big) and ￿0￿￿ ￿ ￿
0￿￿ or if externalities
(Ab and Ba) are big enough.
Proof. (a) Given the hypothesis, if O(￿;￿) can induce higher investment from
A, then ￿0Aa + (1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba < ￿Aa + (1 ￿ ￿)Ba or(￿0 ￿ ￿)Aa < (￿
0 ￿ ￿)Ba. This
implies that (￿0 ￿ ￿) < (￿
0 ￿ ￿) when Aa > Ba. Similarly, if O(￿;￿) can induce
higher investment from B, then (1 ￿ ￿0)Ab+￿
0Bb < (1 ￿ ￿)Ab+￿Bb or (￿0 ￿ ￿)Ab >
(￿
0 ￿ ￿)Bb, which contradicts with the hypothesis that Bb > Ab. In particular when
Ab and Ba are small enough relative to Aa and Bb respectively, because ￿ < ￿0 and
￿ < ￿
0, we can have (￿0 ￿ ￿)Aa > (￿
0 ￿ ￿)Ba and (￿
0 ￿ ￿)Bb > (￿0 ￿ ￿)Ab, which
implies that a(￿;￿) < a(￿0;￿
0) and b(￿;￿) < b(￿0;￿
0), where (a(￿;￿);b(￿;￿)) is the
investment pair under O(￿;￿) and (a(￿0;￿
0);b(￿0;￿
0)) is the investment pair under
O(￿0;￿
0).
(b) If Aa < Ba, Bb < Ab and ￿0￿￿ ￿ ￿
0￿￿ or Ab and Ba are big enough, then we
have ￿0Aa+(1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba < ￿Aa+(1 ￿ ￿)Ba and (1 ￿ ￿0)Ab+￿
0Bb < (1 ￿ ￿)Ab+￿Bb,
which implies that a(￿;￿) > a(￿0;￿
0) and b(￿;￿) > b(￿0;￿
0).
The intuition of Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. There are two fac-
tors at work in the model: a hold-up problem and investment externalities. The
18former causes underinvestment in all organization structures, and the latter (some-
what surprisingly) serve as remedies to the underinvestment problem that are better
utilized under integration. Integration works best when there are strong remedies
with which to work.
The way in which investment externalities serve as remedies to the underinvest-
ment problem can be understood as the follows. Essentially, what integration does
can be roughly viewed as swapping outside options. It bene￿ts one party but hurts
the other party when the total outside option is ￿xed. However, here the total outside
option is a function of the two parties￿investments. When one party￿ s investment is
less productive in the other￿ s outside option, swapping hurts the former party￿ s in-
vestment incentives. However, when one party￿ s investment is more productive in the
other￿ s outside option, swapping enhances the former party￿ s investment incentives.
Situations under which the hypothesis of part (b) of Proposition 2 hold, i.e. when
one consultant￿ s investment has a bigger impact on the other￿ s outside identity than
on their own, are not hard to ￿nd in reality. For example, in Ford￿ s recent crisis with
its Explorer, even though it is generally believed that the exceptionally high roll-over
rate of the parpular model was due to defects in the tires produced by Firestone,
one of Ford￿ s biggest worries was that customers would stop buying the model even
19though the problematic tires were replaced.4 Given the importance of the Explorer
to Ford￿ s revenue, one can imagine that Firestone￿ s investment in preventing this
problem in advance might have had a bigger impact on Ford￿ s identity than on
Firestone￿ s.
2.3 Alternating-o⁄ers bargaining
In the property rights approach to the theory of the ￿rms, Chiu [3] and De Meza
and Lockwood [10] show that some important results of GHM, such as ownership
always enhances investment incentives, can be overturned if the bargaining structure
is changed from Nash bargaining to alternating-o⁄er bargain. This section examines
whether the same di⁄erence exists under the current framework. Again, consider
organization structure O(￿;￿), where ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 [0;1]. Under alternating-
o⁄er bargaining, consultant A or consultant B￿ s reservation value will not matter
unless their individual rationality (IR) constraint binds. We can follow the procedure
of De Meza and Lockwood [10] and partition the space of feasible investment A ￿ B
4See ￿ Tyre straits￿ , Aug 31st 2000, the Economist.











a;bj￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B >
1
2





a;bj(1 ￿ ￿)A + ￿B >
1
2
[A + B] ￿ ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B
￿
.
In R0 (￿;￿), neither consultant A nor consultant B￿ s IR constraint binds. In RA (￿;￿),
consultant A￿ s IR constraint binds but consultant B￿ s does not. In RB (￿;￿), con-
sultant B￿ s IR constraint binds but consultant A￿ s does not. This allows us to write
consultant A and consultant B￿ s payo⁄s as
￿a +
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1
2 [A + B] if (a;b) 2 R0 (￿;￿)
￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B if (a;b) 2 RA (￿;￿)




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
1
2 [A + B] if (a;b) 2 R0 (￿;￿)
A + B ￿ (￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B) if (a;b) 2 RA (￿;￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)A + ￿B if (a;b) 2 RB (￿;￿)
.
Without loss of generality, assume that consultant B￿ s IR constraint never binds,
so we can ignore the case of (a;b) 2 RB (￿;￿). Consequently, Nash equilibrium can











[A + B] ￿ b;
aA = argmax
a ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B ￿ a, and
bA = argmax
b
A + B ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)B ￿ b.
The boundary between R0 (￿;￿) and RA (￿;￿) is determined by the equation
1
2
[A(a;b) + B (a;b)] ￿ ￿A ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)B = 0: (7)





2 [Aa + Ba] ￿ ￿Aa ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ba
1
2 [Ab + Bb] ￿ ￿Ab ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Bb
(8)
For simplicity, the following assumption allows us to focus on the case in which
the boundary between set RI
0 and RI
A is downward sloping.
Assumption 1: db
da < 0.5
5This assumption holds whenever 1
2 > ￿ and has the same e⁄ect as Assumption 4 of De Meza
22In equation (8), 1
2 [Aa + Ba] ￿ MBA0 is the marginal bene￿t of consultant A￿ s
investment when consultant A￿ s IR constraint is not binding, ￿Aa + (1 ￿ ￿)Ba ￿
MBAA is the marginal bene￿t of consultant A￿ s investment when consultant A￿ s
IR constraint is binding, 1
2 [Aa + Ba] ￿ MBB0 is the marginal bene￿t of consultant
B￿ s investment when consultant A￿ s IR constraint is not binding, and [Ab + Bb] ￿
￿Ab￿(1 ￿ ￿)Bb ￿ MBBA is the marginal bene￿t of consultant B￿ s investment when







The following analysis focuses on pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium of the following
two possible cases under Assumption 1.6
Case 1: MBA0 ￿ MBAA > 0 and MBBA ￿ MBB0 > 0 for all ￿;￿ 2 [0;1].
Case 2: MBA0 ￿ MBAA < 0 and MBBA ￿ MBB0 < 0 for all ￿;￿ 2 [0;1].
It is easy to see that bA > b0 (because MBBA > MBB0) and a0 > aA (because
MBA0 > MBAA) in Case 1 and that bA < b0 (because MBBA < MBB0) and a0 < aA
(because MBA0 < MBAA) in Case 2. We label this preliminary result Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In Case 1, the binding of consultant A￿ s IR constraint will decrease con-
and Lockwood [10].
6We ignore any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium because it will not entail any qualitative change
in the results.
23sultant A￿ s investment and increase consultant B￿ s investment. In Case 2, the binding
of consultant A￿ s IR constraint will increase consultant A￿ s investment and decrease
consultant B￿ s investment.
One of the important results of Chiu [3] and De Meza and Lockwood [10] is that
ownership might be bad for investment incentives. This is parallel to Lemma 3,
which states that outside recognition can causes employees￿IR constraint to bind
and decrease their investment.
Lemma 1 of the previous section shows that there is always underinvestment
regardless of the ownership structure when consultants A and B bargain under the
Nash bargaining structure. This is due to the hold-up problem, and changing the
bargaining structure to alternating-o⁄er bargaining should not change this underlying
feature. Lemma 4 veri￿es this.
Lemma 4 If consultants A and B bargain under the alternating-o⁄ers bargaining
structure, there will be underinvestment under any organization structure O(￿;￿).
That is, if aT and bT are the equilibrium investment levels when consultants A and





￿ for all ￿;￿ 2 [0;1].
24Proof. From Lemma 3 we know that the highest investment of A is a0 in Case
1 and aA in Case 2. The fact that aT < a￿ can be obtained by an argument similar
to Lemma 1￿ s proof. The proof of bT < b￿ is symmetric.
In comparing any change of organization structure, one of the major concerns is
whether the change will cause consultant A￿ s IR constraint to bind, which in turn
will cause a discrete jump (Case 1) or fall (Case 2) in her investment. To be more
speci￿c, for any two organization structures O(￿;￿) and O(￿0;￿
0) if consultant A￿ s
IR constraint is binding under O(￿0;￿
0) but not under O(￿;￿), then we know from
Lemma 3 that O(￿0;￿
0) induce higher investment from A and lower investment from
B in Case 1, and induce lower investment from A and higher investment from B in
Case 2.
If consultant A￿ s IR constraint is binding under both O(￿;￿) and O(￿0;￿
0), then
consultant A￿ s payo⁄ is ￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B ￿ a; and consultant B￿ s payo⁄ is A + B ￿
(￿A + (1 ￿ ￿)B) ￿ b. In this case, O(￿;￿) induce higher investment from A than
can O(￿0;￿
0) if and only if ￿Aa + (1 ￿ ￿)Ba > ￿0Aa + (1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba, and O(￿;￿) can
induce higher investment from B than can O(￿0;￿
0) if and only if ￿Ab+(1 ￿ ￿)Bb <
￿0Ab + (1 ￿ ￿
0)Bb.
If consultant A￿ s IR constraint is not binding under either O(￿;￿) or O(￿0;￿
0),
then consultant A￿ s payo⁄is 1
2 [A + B]￿a and consultant B￿ s payo⁄is 1
2 [A + B]￿b.
25In this case, the boundaries of the ￿rms do not matter because ￿ and ￿ do not enter
either A or consultant B￿ s payo⁄ function. Proposition 3 summarizes the above
results.
Proposition 3 Given any two organization structures O(￿;￿) and O(￿0;￿
0),
￿ If consultant A￿ s IR constraint is binding under O(￿0;￿
0) but not under O(￿;￿),
then O(￿;￿) induces higher investment from A and lower investment from B
than does O(￿0;￿
0) in Case 1, and O(￿;￿) induces lower investment from A
and higher investment from B than does O(￿0;￿
0) in Case 2.
￿ If consultant A￿ s IR constraint is binding under both O(￿;￿) and O(￿0;￿
0),
then O(￿;￿) induce higher investment from A than does O(￿0;￿
0) if and only
if ￿Aa + (1 ￿ ￿)Ba > ￿0Aa + (1 ￿ ￿
0)Ba, and O(￿;￿) can induce higher
investment from B than does O(￿0;￿
0) if and only if ￿Ab + (1 ￿ ￿)Bb <
￿0Ab + (1 ￿ ￿
0)Bb.
￿ If consultant A￿ s IR constraint is binding under neither O(￿;￿) nor O(￿0;￿
0),
then the boundaries of the ￿rms do not matter.
263 The Repeated Investment Game ￿ Relational
Contracts
The previous two sections assume that neither the outputs (consultants A and B)
nor the investments (a and b) are contractible. However, in a repeated relationship, a
desirable investment or output level by one party might be enforced by the threat of
future punishment from the other party. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] referred to
such types of enforcement as ￿ relational contracts￿and showed that ￿rm boundaries
still matter when the investment game is repeated and parties can sign relational
contracts. This section extends their results under the new de￿nition of the ￿rm.
Denote USA (a;b;￿;￿) ￿ ￿A+(1 ￿ ￿)B+1
2 [A + B ￿ A ￿ B] and USB (a;b;￿;￿) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)A+￿B+ 1
2 [A + B ￿ A ￿ B] as the ￿ spot￿(where the investment game is not
repeated) gross bene￿t of consultants A and B, respectively. For any given O(￿;￿),
the equilibrium investment levels aS and bS maximize (3) and (4)7, i.e.
a
















When the investment game is repeated, a relational contract can be written on
7Here we ignore the case of alternating-o⁄er bargaining.
27any variable, in particular the outputs (A and B) and investments (a and b), that is
observable to both parties. Hence, we can focus on any division of the total surplus,






RA (a;b) + U
RB (a;b) = A(a;b) + B (a;b):
Hence, the equilibrium investment
￿
aR;bR￿


















Note that URA (a;b) and URB (a;b) are a priori independent of how the bound-
aries of the ￿rms are set up.
In accordance with Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1], we assume that after any
party reneges on the relational contract, the two parties live forever under spot gover-
nance with the optimal ownership structure O(￿￿;￿
￿); where (￿￿;￿
￿) = argmax(￿;￿) A(a;b)+











8Suppose that second order conditions are satis￿ed.






























































































where the left hand side is the net present value of the total future punishment if one










URA ￿ t;URB + t
￿
satis￿es both (9) and (10),
without loss of generality we can focus on (11) as a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for a relational contract to be feasible.
The major results of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy [1] are that (i) asset ownership
29will a⁄ect the feasibility of relational contracts and (ii) the ability to use relational
contracts does not render a particular ownership structure always dominant ￿own-
ership structure matters. In this section, two analogous results are obtained under
the new de￿nition of the ￿rms.
First, by examining (11) we know that organization structure a⁄ects the total
temptation to renege, which in turn determines the feasibility of a relational contract.
This straightforward result is analogous to (i) and is labeled Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Whether a given relational contract is feasible depends on the un-
derlying organization structure.
The intuition behind (ii) is that relational contracts cannot mimic spot bargain-
ing. This can also be seen under the current framework. Consider implementing
aS (￿;￿) and bS (￿;￿) under O(￿0;￿
0); where ￿ 6= ￿0 or ￿ 6= ￿
0. The only way
to do this is to set URA (a;b) = USA ￿
aS (￿;￿);bS (￿;￿);￿;￿
￿




. The punishment to renege is negative because the














































which is nonnegative. Hence, (11) will not hold. This result is summarized in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 Spot bargaining under one organization structure cannot be mimicked
by relational contracts under another organization structure. Technically, if ￿ 6= ￿0 or
￿ 6= ￿
0 then a￿ (￿;￿) and b￿ (￿;￿) cannot be in equilibrium under O(￿0;￿
0); even
when relational contracts are allowed.
4 Conclusion
By introducing a new de￿nition of the ￿rms, this paper extends the incomplete-
contract framework of the property-rights approach to the theory of the ￿rms, and
establishes a new theory that places people at the centers of the ￿rms. The new
de￿nition can totally ignore physical assets and view a ￿rm as a group of people who
work in a close relationship so that external markets cannot distinguish them indi-
vidually. This new de￿nition helps to explain the merger of human-capital intensive
31￿rms such as professional service ￿rms. In addition, a new role of externalities in
determining boundaries of the ￿rms is presented.
These results can also be applied to other types of ￿rms, as long as integration
entails some identity blurring among the integrating parties. However, the ￿rms
de￿ned here may look di⁄erent to ￿rms de￿ned legally in practice, because it is
di¢ cult to de￿ne a ￿rm in terms of intangible elements such as outside identi￿cation.
Nevertheless, we believe the new de￿nition captures some important aspects of the
￿rms. The model is very simple, so it should be easy to extend in future work. One
possible extension is to allow investing parties to ￿ght for outside identi￿cation.
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